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“DOES OREGON’S CONSTITUTION NEED A DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE?” 
THOUGHTS ON DUE PROCESS AND OTHER 
LIMITATIONS ON STATE ACTION 
Thomas A. Balmer* 
INTRODUCTION 
During a legislative hearing last year, an Oregon state senator asked, 
“Does Oregon’s Constitution need a due process clause?” That question 
raises fundamental issues of constitutional law and of the relationship 
between the federal and state constitutions. Can and should state courts 
rely primarily on federal constitutional principles, made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in 
deciding critical questions about the rights of criminal defendants, 
freedom of speech and religion, and equal protection? Or should state 
courts focus on their own constitutions—state due process, equal 
privileges and immunities, and similar “great ordinances” or more 
specific state provisions—in determining whether state laws and 
executive branch actions are valid? Would that focus still allow state 
courts to reach the “right” result in cases where no specific constitutional 
provision provides a clear basis for decision? 
Professor (and later Oregon Supreme Court Justice) Hans Linde’s 
path-breaking 1970 article, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional 
Law in Oregon,1 addressed some of those questions and contributed to 
the state constitutional revolution of the succeeding decades.2 That 
* Chief Justice, Oregon Supreme Court. I am indebted to Zoee Turill Powers and Alletta Brenner 
for research and editorial assistance and to Jack Landau and Hugh Spitzer for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
1. Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 
(1970).  
2. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113–34 (2009); Jack L. 
Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. 
L. REV. 793, 815–26 (2000); see also INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JUSTICE 
HANS LINDE TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995) [hereinafter 
INTELLECT AND CRAFT]. 
157 
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revolution, with its emphasis on examining the text and meaning of state 
constitutional provisions,3 has had the positive effect of requiring courts 
(and litigants) to articulate the specific interests at stake in light of those 
provisions, rather than engaging in an open-ended inquiry into whether a 
state’s economic regulatory scheme was arbitrary or unreasonable and 
thus potentially unconstitutional under the Federal Due Process Clause 
or whether a state law impermissibly interfered with some fundamental 
right. But it has its shortcomings as well, and, at times, has been 
susceptible to the same kind of result-oriented decisions for which 
substantive due-process-driven analysis has long been criticized. In this 
Essay, I briefly examine several aspects of state court reliance on “due 
process” provisions—both state and federal—in an effort to see what is 
lost and what is gained by relying instead on other state constitutional 
provisions. In doing so, we can see some of the changes in state 
constitutional interpretation forty-five years after Linde’s article and 
begin to seek an answer to our legislator’s question.4  
I. THE OREGON CONSTITUTION HAS NO DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE—BUT THE OREGON SUPREME COURT DIDN’T 
NOTICE FOR 100 YEARS 
We begin where Linde did, with several Oregon cases that purported 
to rely on the due process clause of the Oregon Constitution and that 
illustrate what he saw as the shortcomings of constitutional analysis at 
the time. In Leathers v. City of Burns,5 the Oregon State Supreme Court 
considered two city ordinances that regulated the unloading and storage 
of flammable liquids by, among other things, prohibiting unloading fuel 
from a truck with a capacity of over 2200 gallons and using a storage 
tank holding more than 3000 gallons (or 4000 for a single service station 
or facility).6 A service station operator challenged the constitutionality 
of the ordinances as arbitrary and unreasonable, arguing that they 
deprived him of property and liberty interests without due process of 
3. Indeed, Linde can be seen as an early “textualist,” although not necessarily an “originalist” of 
the Antonin Scalia variety. Linde’s teachings have influenced academics and courts in Oregon and 
elsewhere. See Thomas A. Balmer & Katherine Thomas, In the Balance: Thoughts on Balancing 
and Alternative Approaches in State Constitutional Interpretation, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2027, 2028, 
2047–49 (2012–2013). 
4. I should note, however, that we are using the questions posed here primarily to illuminate 
aspects of state constitutional law and that the outlines of any answers are only suggestive and 
conditional. 
5. 444 P.2d 1010 (Or. 1968). 
6. Id. at 1011. 
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law.7 What was as interesting to Linde as the substantive decision in the 
case—the Court upheld the restriction on tanker size but struck down the 
storage tank size limit—was the way the Court went about deciding the 
case and what it said about due process. The Court first summarized the 
complaint as alleging that “the ordinances violate the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Federal and state constitutions.”8 Then, 
after reviewing the evidence at trial, and to introduce its legal analysis 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court observed, “What we hold applies equally to 
plaintiff’s claim of violation of comparable provisions of the 
Constitution of Oregon.”9 
Similarly, just a few weeks before Leathers, the Court held a 
municipal vagrancy ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds that the 
ordinance was “too vague to provide a standard adequate for the 
protection of constitutional rights.”10 The Court stated that the law 
invited “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,”11 and held that it 
violated the “due process clause of [a]rticle I, [s]ection 10 of the Oregon 
Constitution, as well as the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution.”12 
Professor Linde had the chutzpah to point out that despite the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s statements in Leathers, City of Portland, and other 
cases, “Oregon has no ‘due process’ clause. It also does not guarantee 
the equal protection of the laws.”13 As we will discuss below, the 
Oregon Constitution has other broad provisions protecting individual 
rights and liberties from government interference, but it has no 
provisions that track the text or specific focus of the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent 
that Oregon courts have sometimes based their decisions on the “due 
process” or “equal protection” provisions of the Oregon Constitution, 
7. Id. at 1015. 
8. Id. at 1011. 
9. Id. at 1015. 
10. City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554, 557 (Or. 1968). 
11. Id. at 557. 
12. Id. at 555. Article 1, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution is worded differently from the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and from similar provisions in other state 
constitutions. As I discuss below, it is more accurately described as an “open courts,” “remedy,” or 
“due course of law” provision. It provides: “No court shall be secret, but justice shall be 
administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have 
remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation.” OR. CONST. 
art. 1, § 10. 
13. Linde, supra note 1, at 135 (emphasis in original).  
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they have erred. We have no such provisions. 
Linde’s legacy had two different and important aspects, and the 
double entendre of his article’s title captures both: First, the absence of a 
due process clause in the Oregon Constitution and second, the process of 
constitutional decision-making without relying on the Federal Due 
Process Clause. As we have just seen, Without “Due Process” suggests 
first that, the Oregon State Supreme Court’s occasional contrary 
statements notwithstanding, the Oregon Constitution does not have a due 
process clause. Linde urged lawyers and judges to actually read, 
interpret, and apply constitutional (and other) texts, rather than simply 
balance an amorphous and malleable understanding of the state’s “police 
power”— another term, Linde often observed, that does not appear in 
the Constitution of Oregon (or any other state)—against asserted 
constitutional rights.14 And he often pointed out that many state 
constitutions have specific, often detailed, provisions regarding rights of 
expression, religion, and criminal procedure that are not found in the 
Federal Bill of Rights and that could provide a firmer basis for state 
court decisions.15 
Before long, the Oregon State Supreme Court came around, citing 
Linde’s article and holding (contrary to earlier decisions) that article I, 
section 10, of the Oregon Constitution was not a due process provision 
and that the equal privileges and immunities clause (article I, section 20, 
of the Oregon Constitution) and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were not necessarily “equivalents.”16 In 1985, 
after Professor Linde had become Justice Linde, the Court, in a routine 
case, rejected state and federal due process and equal protection 
challenges to a statute requiring payment of assessed income taxes as a 
precondition to judicial review of a tax dispute.17 Writing for the Court, 
Linde stated that, contrary to the taxpayer’s argument, “[a]rticle I, 
14. Id. at 147–49. 
15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23, 28–30 (Or. 1980) (Linde, J. 
concurring) (discussing constitutional protection of right to open administration of justice under 
Oregon Constitution and arguing that it is more stringent than that offered by the Federal Bill of 
Rights).  
16. Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 143 (Or. 1976). Several years earlier, the Court had noted that 
“Professor Linde demonstrates that [article I, section 10] is not a due process provision, but rather 
has to do with the protection of legal remedies which assert interests recognized in tort law,” but 
had also pointed out that “[t]his court has not always agreed with him.” Sch. Dist. No. 12 of Wasco 
Cty. v. Wasco Cty., 529 P.2d 386, 391 (Or. 1974). Article 1, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution 
provides: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or 
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” OR. CONST. art. I, 
§ 20. 
17. Cole v. Or. Dep’t of Revenue, 655 P.2d 171, 173 (Or. 1982). 
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section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, which guarantees that ‘every 
man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his 
person, property, or reputation,’ is neither in text nor in historical 
function the equivalent of a due process clause.”18 The debate was 
essentially over. 
But the title Without “Due Process” also suggests Linde’s larger 
project, namely his argument that state courts should not turn first to the 
substantive provisions of the Federal Constitution when deciding 
constitutional cases.19 Linde asserted—irrefutably, as a matter of logic—
that there is no federal due process violation if state law, including the 
state constitution, provides the relief a party seeks: 
The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s law, including its 
constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional 
claim. This is required, not for the sake of parochialism or style, 
but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the 
[F]ederal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is 
fully met by state law.20 
This latter impact of Linde’s legacy has been much discussed and is 
thoroughly engrained in Oregon law.21 Other states, Washington being 
an example, have reached similar conclusions.22 But, to return to our 
legislator’s question, has it mattered that Oregon does not have a due 
process clause? 
II. THE OREGON COURT IN THE LOCHNER/SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS ERA 
Interestingly, the cases that Linde used to make his point that the 
Oregon Constitution lacks a due process clause did not involve 
18. Id. 
19. See Linde, supra note 1, at 133–35. 
20. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981). Linde’s view may be supported by logic and 
important prudential considerations, but it is not clear that his central legal contention—that no 
violation of a federal constitutional right has occurred if a state court vindicates the claim under the 
state constitution—is correct. In Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), the Court stated that, at 
least as to nonprocedural federal constitutional guarantees, “the [federal] constitutional violation is 
complete when the wrongful action is taken.” Id. at 125; see also State v. Stoudamire, 108 P.3d 615, 
624–26 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (Landau, J., concurring) (explaining Zinermon in context of applying 
federal and state search and seizure protections). 
21. See generally, e.g., INTELLECT AND CRAFT, supra note 1; Symposium, Symposium on the 
Work of Justice Hans Linde, 70 OR. L. REV. 679 (1991) (volume dedicated to discussion of Linde’s 
legacy and impact on state and federal constitutional law); Symposium, Unparalleled Justice: The 
Legacy of Hans Linde, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 157 (2007) (same). 
22. See, e.g., State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984). 
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procedural claims that the state had denied a person life, liberty, or 
property without adequate process, but rather claims that the state had 
restricted substantive economic or personal liberties protected by the 
federal and state constitutions.23 Moreover, Linde’s examples were from 
the 1960s, long after the United States Supreme Court had stopped using 
“substantive due process” to strike down economic regulation, and as the 
Court was beginning to use the concept of substantive due process 
instead to protect rights of privacy and personal autonomy. Nevertheless, 
it’s useful to look back to the era when both state and federal courts 
often used substantive due process to invalidate statutes regulating labor 
and other aspects of the economy, and to observe how the Oregon State 
Supreme Court approached those kinds of challenges. Based on now-
discredited cases such as Lochner v. New York,24 the United States 
Supreme Court is often viewed as having been hostile to labor and 
economic legislation at the turn of the twentieth century. But, as Emily 
Zacklin reminds us, the Court, in fact, upheld a number of progressive 
efforts to protect working people.25 Rather, as Zacklin argues, state 
courts—interpreting both state and federal due process clauses (often 
without even quoting the provisions or differentiating between state and 
federal law)—struck down many regulatory statutes, and were, on the 
whole, probably more hostile to labor and other progressive legislation 
at the time than the United States Supreme Court.26 Similarly, Hugh 
Spitzer has surveyed the Washington decisions of the same period and 
finds that the Washington State Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries often struck down regulatory legislation, such 
as a law providing for the inspection of commodities, even though those 
commodities were not intended for immediate sale to the public.27 By 
the second decade of the new century, however, the Washington State 
Supreme Court was routinely upholding legislation regulating public 
utilities, maximum working hours for women, and mandatory workers’ 
compensation insurance.28 
23. See, e.g., City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554 (Or. 1968); Leathers v. City of Burns, 444 
P.2d 1010 (Or. 1968). 
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
25. EMILY ZACKLIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 134–38 (2013). 
26. Id. at 109. 
27. Hugh Spitzer, Pivoting to Progressivism: Justice Stephen J. Chadwick, the Washington 
Supreme Court, and Change in Early 20th-Century Judicial Reasoning and Rhetoric, 104 PAC. NW. 
Q. 107 (2013). 
28. Id. at 108. 
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But what about Oregon? While the Oregon Supreme Court seriously 
entertained substantive due process challenges to labor and economic 
regulation during this period, it generally deferred to the legislature and 
upheld laws that seemed reasonably related to a legitimate legislative 
goal. In 1902, for example, a barber challenged a state law that 
prohibited the operation of barbershops on Sunday, arguing that, by 
permitting (some) other businesses to remain open, the law was arbitrary 
and unreasonable.29 Accordingly, the barber asserted that the act violated 
the Federal Due Process Clause “in that it deprived [him] of liberty or 
property without due process of law,” and also violated article I, section 
1 of the Oregon Constitution “in that it encroached upon his guaranty of 
equal rights.”30 The Court reviewed the history of Oregon’s Sunday 
closure laws and decisions from around the country upholding such laws 
as reasonable exercises of the state’s police power. Indeed, a similar 
case—involving a general Sunday closure law that exempted businesses 
of “necessity and charity,” but did not include barbers in that group—
had gone to the United States Supreme Court, which had upheld the 
law.31 The United States Supreme Court had noted the “wide discretion 
confessedly necessarily exercised by the states in these matters,”32 which 
prohibited only classifications “so palpably arbitrary as to bring the law 
into conflict with the federal constitution.”33 The Oregon Court followed 
suit, quoting other state decisions regarding legislation that would 
prevent “overwork” and protect “the physical welfare of the citizen,” 
and upheld the Sunday closing requirement.34 
Perhaps the most famous Oregon case of that period was State v. 
Muller,35 where the Court considered due process and other 
constitutional challenges to a statute that made it unlawful to employ a 
woman in a laundry for more than ten hours a day.36 Curt Muller had 
been fined ten dollars for employing a Mrs. E. Gotcher for more than the 
maximum permissible hours at his Portland laundry on September 4, 
29. Ex parte Northrup, 69 P. 445, 445–46 (Or. 1902). 
30. Id. at 446. Article I, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, provides in part: “We declare that 
all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right.” OR. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
31. Northrup, 69 P. at 493–46 (citing State v. Petit, 77 N.W. 225 (Minn. 1898), aff’d, 177 U.S. 
164 (1900)). 
32. Id. at 447 (quoting Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 168 (1900)). 
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 494–47. 
35. 85 P. 855 (Or. 1906).  
36. Id. 
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1905.37 Seeking to overturn his conviction, Muller argued that the law 
interfered with his female employees’ liberty of contract and that it 
discriminated against women and in favor of men.38 The Oregon Court 
cited the then-recent decision in Lochner for the general proposition that 
the freedom to contract is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “cannot be arbitrarily 
interfered with by the legislature.”39 But the Court quickly added that 
“the right to labor and to contract for labor, like all rights, is itself 
subject to such reasonable limitations as are essential to the peace, 
health, welfare, and good order of the community.”40 The Court upheld 
the statute. 
When Muller took his case to the United States Supreme Court, Louis 
Brandeis was recruited to support the state’s defense of its statute. He 
briefed and argued the case (along with a local Oregon lawyer), and 
prevailed in Muller v. Oregon.41 The Supreme Court opinion’s emphasis 
on the role of women as mothers whose health is “essential to vigorous 
offspring,” and to protecting “the strength and vigor of the race,” was 
certainly a victory for progressive labor legislation, even at the 
temporary expense of the broader cause of women’s equality, including 
the right to vote that was gaining prominence at the same time.42 That 
focus, at least, allowed the Court to distinguish Lochner, but it would be 
almost another thirty years before the Court altered its substantive due 
process analysis and began regularly upholding labor and economic 
regulatory legislation against due process challenges. 
While the Oregon courts generally upheld progressive legislation 
under general federal or state constitutional provisions, they certainly 
took such challenges seriously, often evaluating new laws to decide 
whether they were “arbitrary” or “unreasonable” or beyond the state’s 
“police power.” More interesting perhaps, as Without “Due Process” 
reminds us, is that state courts have continued to apply substantive due 
process principles to economic and other regulatory statutes long after 
the United States Supreme Court abandoned that approach in the late 
1930s.43 Robert Williams also has pointed out that states continue to use 
37. Id.  
38. Id. at 855–56. 
39. Id. at 856. 
40. Id.  
41. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). For interesting additional background on the case, see Ronald K.L. 
Collins & Jennifer Friesen, Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 294 (1983). 
42. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. 
43. Linde, supra note 1, at 163–66. 
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substantive due process to scrutinize—and occasionally hold 
unconstitutional—economic regulation, despite the federal courts’ 
“hands-off” approach. In contrast to the Lochner era, however, Williams 
points out that state courts generally act in what they perceive to be the 
interest of the general public, rather than narrower business interests.44 
III. THE PIVOT FROM DUE PROCESS TO OTHER, SPECIFIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
If a state constitution lacks a due process clause, and if we follow 
Linde and consider state constitutional arguments before turning to the 
Federal Due Process Clause, how should a state court approach broad 
constitutional challenges to state laws or policies? One answer, driven 
by Linde’s suggestion that courts actually consider the text—the whole 
text—of their state constitutions, is for litigants and state courts to focus 
on the narrower and sometimes forgotten provisions that hide in dark 
corners of many state constitutions. 
State constitutions often have more specific protections of individual 
rights than we find in the Federal Constitution. As a result, at least with 
respect to these specific provisions, state constitutions may provide more 
direct guidance to courts. One notable example of such a case is Linde’s 
decision in Sterling v. Cupp.45 In that case, male prison inmates 
challenged a state practice allowing female prison guards to conduct 
body searches of male inmates and to monitor them, even in showers or 
toilets.46 The inmates argued that those activities violated their 
constitutional right to privacy.47 The Oregon Court of Appeals had 
agreed with the inmates, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s 
then-recent decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,48 in which the Court 
concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(when considered with other provisions in the Bill of Rights) protects a 
“right of privacy,” and held that the state policy at issue violated that 
right.49 
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision in 
Sterling, but on a different ground, looking instead to Oregon’s own 
constitution. Justice Linde, consistent with his earlier article, first 
44. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 190–92. 
45. 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981). 
46. Id. at 125. 
47. Id. at 126. 
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
49. See Sterling, 625 P.2d at 126 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479). 
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rejected the court of appeals’ approach of turning to the Federal Due 
Process Clause before it had considered whether the Oregon 
Constitution precluded the state’s policy.50 Perhaps to the surprise of the 
plaintiffs, who had not raised the argument, Linde looked to article I, 
section 13, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides, “No person 
arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor.”51 
Nothing in the history of that provision indicated that it had anything to 
do with searches, pat-downs, or the monitoring of incarcerated 
individuals, let alone of the gender of the prison guards performing those 
functions.52 To fill that gap, Linde looked to and relied upon what he 
conceded were “nonofficial”53 standards regarding the treatment of 
prisoners, including those adopted by the American Bar Association and 
the American Correctional Association, as well as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and documents from various United 
Nations agencies.54 
Sterling illustrates the strengths and potential weaknesses of focusing 
on specific state constitutional provisions rather than trying to discern 
the ill-defined parameters of the substantive aspect of the Due Process 
Clause—particularly the “right to privacy”—and apply that provision to 
a novel fact situation. Linde correctly pointed out the difficulties of 
defining the privacy right protected by the Due Process Clause,55 but a 
disinterested observer might question whether the interpretive exercise 
Linde undertook instead—deciding whether a male prisoner searched or 
observed while showering by a female guard had been “treated with 
unnecessary rigor”—was much less open-ended. A dissenting opinion 
made the reasonable point that there appeared to be nothing to indicate 
“that the ‘unnecessary rigor’ clause was intended to authorize the courts 
to enforce standards of delicacy or courtesy among adults in prison in 
the name of the constitution,” and added that the correctional standards 
Linde cited “are worthy of respectful attention from the legislature or the 
executive branch, but they are no substitute for the constitution and they 
50. Id. at 126.  
51. Id. at 128.  
52. See id. at 128–29 (discussing historical underpinnings of provision); id. at 140 (Tanzer, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that there is “no evidence that the ‘unnecessary rigor’ clause was intended to 
authorize courts to enforce standards of delicacy or courtesy among adults in prison in the name of 
the constitution”).  
53. Id. at 130 (majority opinion). 
54. Id. at 128–32. 
55. Id. at 129. 
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do not provide a mandate for judicial intervention.”56 
Nevertheless, Sterling reminds us that state constitutions contain a 
variety of sometimes forgotten provisions that may provide better, or at 
least state constitution-based, grounds for invalidating state statutes or 
policies; this may avoid other problems that can arise from reliance on 
the Due Process Clause. And, as Linde also noted in Without “Due 
Process,” grounding a decision on an independent interpretation of a 
state constitutional provision, rather than the Due Process Clause, 
insulates the decision from possible review and reversal by the United 
States Supreme Court.57 
A less dramatic, but perhaps more satisfying example of using a 
narrow, more specific state constitutional provision rather than a more 
general state or federal provision, can be found in Oregon’s handling of 
challenges to criminal penalties on the ground that they are not 
proportional to the offense.58 Article I, section 16, of the Oregon 
Constitution provides, in part, “[c]ruel and unusual punishments shall 
not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.”59 
In earlier days, if a defendant challenged a sentence as unconstitutional 
because it was draconian compared to the crime—say, life in prison for a 
first-time trespass—the defendant and the court would look to the cruel 
and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment or to an 
analogous state constitutional provision. 
In a case from the early twentieth century, State v. Ross,60 the 
defendant was convicted of larceny and sentenced to pay a fine of 
$576,853.74, to serve five years in the state penitentiary, and to spend 
one day in the county jail for every two dollars of the fine, not to exceed 
288,426 days.61 The Oregon Supreme Court held that the sentence was 
so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but engaged 
in essentially no textual or other analysis of any state or federal 
56. Id. at 140 (Tanzer, J., dissenting). The dissent also rejected the “privacy” theory adopted by 
the court of appeals, pointing out that the plaintiffs had not challenged the State’s right to search 
inmates, but only “the authority of the [S]tate to have the searches performed by persons of either 
sex.” Id. at 139. The dissent argued that “plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy is not lessened and their 
exposure to searches is not enlarged according to the sex of the person searching.” Id.  
57. Linde, supra note 1, at 134–35, 159–60.  
58. See generally Thomas A. Balmer, Some Thoughts on Proportionality, 87 OR. L. REV. 783 
(2008). 
59. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 16.  
60. 104 P. 596 (Or. 1909), modified, 106 P. 1022 (Or. 1910), appeal dismissed, 227 U.S. 150 
(1913). 
61. Ross, 104 P. at 599. 
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constitutional provision.62 A decade later, when a defendant challenged 
his sentence of six months in jail and a $500 fine for possessing two 
quarts of “moonshine,” the Court expressly addressed under the Oregon 
Constitution his claim that the sentence was not “proportioned”63 to the 
offense, although the decision relied primarily on a United States 
Supreme Court case interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.64 More recently, the Court has analyzed 
the proportionality requirement in detail and developed an analytical 
structure to guide that determination.65 That approach has been 
particularly important because of uncertainty as to whether the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment contains an 
implicit ban on sentences that are simply excessive or disproportionate 
to the crime in some respect, or instead whether the prohibition speaks 
only to the nature of the sanction itself.66 By relying on Oregon’s 
explicit proportionality requirement, the Oregon Court has used the 
appropriate state constitutional provision to examine claims that 
sentences were excessive, has been able to develop case law interpreting 
the explicit requirement of proportionality in the constitution, and has, 
on occasion, overturned criminal sentences on that ground.67 
The larger point, briefly alluded to before, is that state constitutions 
often have more specific protections of individual rights than are found 
in the United States Constitution. Reliance on those state texts—rather 
than on federal provisions made applicable to the states by the Due 
Process Clause—is not only legally sound (legally required, Linde 
would say), but more satisfactory generally because they provide more 
direct guidance to the courts and have the legitimacy of being traceable 
to the work of the constitutional framers. Other examples of Oregon’s 
constitution providing more specific provisions than the Federal 
Constitution include its free expression provision, which is written in 
broader terms than the First Amendment;68 the multiple provisions 
regarding religious liberty, including a specific provision preventing 
state funds from being spent in support of religion;69 and the specific 
directives that “no court shall be secret,” and that justice is to be 
62. See Ross, 106 P. at1024.  
63. Sustar v. Cnty. Court of Marion Cnty., 201 P. 445, 448 (Or. 1921). 
64. Id. at 446, 448.  
65. See, e.g., State v. Wheeler, 175 P.3d 438 (Or. 2007). 
66. Balmer, supra note 58, at 799–804.  
67. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 217 P.3d 659 (Or. 2009). 
68. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
69. See, e.g., id. §§ 1–6 
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administered “openly.”70 
IV. GREAT ORDINANCES: EQUAL PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES, AND DUE COURSE OF LAW 
Suppose a government action seems to intrude too far into areas of 
personal privacy, to be arbitrary and unreasonable, or to discriminate 
unfairly against a particular person or group—and in contrast to a 
punishment that involves “excessive rigor” or is not “proportioned to the 
offense,” there is no specific constitutional provision that can plausibly 
be invoked. Do other provisions of the Oregon Constitution protect those 
individual rights that are less well-defined? Although, as we have seen, 
the Oregon Constitution does not contain a true due process clause or an 
equal protection clause, it does include several of what Williams, 
quoting Justice Holmes, has called the “great ordinances of the 
Constitution”—those broadly, and somewhat vaguely, phrased 
provisions by which constitution writers attempted to circumscribe 
government actions that they could not (or did not want to) identify with 
specificity.71 In the Oregon Constitution, these include the equal 
privileges and immunities clause72 and the “due course of law” 
provision73 that guarantees open courts and a “remedy by due course of 
law” for injury to “person, property, or reputation.”74 
Not surprisingly, the Oregon courts have often used those provisions 
to evaluate challenges to state statutes and actions, and sometimes have 
found the state action unconstitutional. In Hewitt v. State Accident 
Insurance Fund Corp.,75 for example, the statute permitted an unmarried 
woman to collect death benefits upon the death of an unmarried man 
with whom she had cohabited for over a year, but did not provide for a 
similarly situated man to receive death benefits.76 The Court agreed with 
the plaintiff—an unmarried man—that the statute treated one class of 
people (unmarried women who had cohabited with unmarried men for a 
particular time period) more favorably than unmarried men in the same 
position.77 The Court described that gender-based classification as 
70. Id. § 10.  
71. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 336–37 (quoting Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977)). 
72. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
73. Id. § 10. 
74. See id.; see also Linde, supra note 1, at 135.  
75. 653 P.2d 970 (Or. 1982). 
76. Id. at 971. 
77. Id. at 977–79. 
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“suspect” and thus subject to close scrutiny.78 Finding no basis to justify 
the different treatment of women and men in that context, the Court held 
that the statute violated the equal privileges and immunities clause of 
article I, section 20.79 
If the Court’s analysis in Hewitt sounds suspiciously like that found in 
federal equal protection decisions, that is because the Court, in fact, cited 
and relied on those cases. The Court recognized that the Equal 
Protection Clause was intended to prevent discrimination against certain 
groups or individuals, while the privileges and immunities provision was 
focused on preventing privileges—usually economic privileges—from 
being granted unequally to favored individuals and groups.80 
Nevertheless, the Court found helpful the equal protection analysis of 
when differential treatment of similarly situated persons might raise 
constitutional problems, although it was quick to point out that it did not 
need to follow then-controlling federal equal protection precedents, 
which were somewhat equivocal on the issue of gender discrimination.81 
Hewitt then provided the groundwork for an important court of 
appeals decision holding that the equal privileges and immunities clause 
of the state constitution barred the state medical school from offering 
health insurance benefits to the spouses of employees but not to the 
similarly situated same sex domestic partners of employees.82 The same 
sex partners argued that, although it might be reasonable to limit benefits 
to spouses, they were unable to become spouses under state law; the 
effect of the benefit policy and the state statute limiting marriage to two 
persons of different genders, considered together, denied them a 
privilege conferred on similarly situated employees.83 The court of 
appeals agreed and held that the disparate treatment violated article I, 
section 20.84 The court observed that the insurance benefits constituted a 
privilege that was not made available to the same-sex partners of OHSU 
employees.85 Those employees constituted a “class” that was treated 
differently solely because of their sexual orientation—and that 
differential treatment was permissible only if it could be justified by 
78. See id. at 977. 
79. Id. at 979. 
80. See id. at 975–76. 
81. Id. at 974–75. 
82. See Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 437 (Or. 1998). 
83. Id. at 444. 
84. Id. at 448. 
85. Id. 
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their sexual orientation.86 As the Court stated, “The parties have 
suggested no such justification, and we can envision none.”87 
Although article I, section 20, provides that “[n]o law shall be passed” 
granting privileges and immunities to some that are not equally available 
to all citizens,88 the Oregon courts have long held that provision to apply 
to executive and other government decisions, as well as to laws enacted 
by the legislature.89 And, despite the provision’s origin in concerns 
about economic privileges, the courts have viewed it as a more general 
prohibition on differential treatment, including for example, charging 
decisions by district attorneys.90 In one recent case, the state attorney 
general argued that the Court should disavow its longstanding approach 
to article I, section 20, and return to what it argued was the original 
scope of the provision as applying only to the legislature and only to 
economic benefits. 91 The Court had little trouble rejecting that effort to 
turn the clock back more than 100 years.92 
The most obvious other “great ordinance” in the Oregon Constitution, 
article I, section 10, is the Oregon constitutional provision most 
frequently confused with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It provides: 
No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, 
openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and 
every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury 
done him in his person, property, or reputation.93 
As the text of the provision makes clear, it touches on a number of vital 
aspects of government and justice. It is referred to as an “open courts” or 
“remedies” or “due course of law” provision. It is not, however, a “due 
86. Id. at 447. 
87. Id. 
88. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
89. See, e.g., State v. Savastano, 309 P.3d 1083, 1093 (Or. 2013) (describing cases). 
90. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810 (Or. 1980). 
91. Savastano, 309 P.3d at 1099. 
92. See id. (finding that the state’s argument “sweeps too broadly” and noting: “[t]he state is 
correct that many early privileges or immunities cases involved monopolies or other economic 
benefits, but nothing in the words of the provision or the historical definitions of those words 
indicates that they do not also apply to noneconomic privileges or immunities conferred by the 
government”). Interestingly, the ACLU of Oregon filed an amicus brief in the Savastano case that 
took no position on the defendant’s underlying argument—that the district attorney was required to 
have an established policy for charging decisions in order to comply to article I, section 20—but 
that vigorously opposed the Attorney General’s effort to return to a narrower interpretation of the 
provision. Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae ALCU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., Savastano, 309 
P.3d 1083 (No. S059973), 2012 WL 3569903. 
93. OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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process” clause, as Linde and others have demonstrated; and indeed its 
origins trace back to a different chapter of Magna Carta than the chapter 
that provides the basis for the Due Process Clause in the Federal 
Constitution.94 The meaning and proper interpretation of article I, 
section 10, are beyond the scope of this brief Essay, but its ancient roots, 
broad application, and contemporary importance place it firmly in the 
“great ordinance” category. The provision has provided fertile ground 
for litigants, particularly related to tort claims, and the Oregon courts 
have sometimes used it to avoid what most people would consider to be 
grossly unjust results. In Clarke v. Oregon Health Sciences University,95 
for example, the Court held unconstitutional a statutory tort claims limit 
of $200,000 as applied to a claim for medical negligence against a state 
hospital and its employees, when the conceded economic damages to a 
newborn caused by the negligence exceeded twelve million dollars.96 
But whether article I, section 10, could be used to protect substantive 
rights outside the tort context is unclear. 
In addition to its importance in tort law, article I, section 10 may 
protect some procedural rights, although, as we have noted, it is not a 
due process clause. We need to recall that Linde’s critique was aimed at 
substantive due process and the use of state and federal due process 
analysis to invalidate state statutes—particularly, but not only, 
regulatory laws—on the grounds that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, 
or not within the so-called police power of the state.97 But aside from 
those categories of cases, article I, section 10 has long been held to 
provide at least some guarantee of procedural fairness, including an 
appropriate and fair hearing before a person can be deprived of property 
rights.98 
94. Linde, supra note 1, at 136–38. See generally David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1202 (1992) (describing history and origins of remedy clauses in state 
constitutions). Oregon’s remedy clause is derived from Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta. See Linde, 
supra note 1, at 138. Sir Edward Coke’s commentary on the Magna Carta, one of the most 
commonly read legal texts in early America, expounded on Chapter 40, providing the language 
from which the remedy clause was later developed: “[E]very Subject of this Realm, for injury done 
to him in [goods, land or person,] . . . may take his remedy by the course of the Law, and have 
justice and right for the injury done him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily 
without delay.” Schuman, supra, at 1199 (alterations in original). 
95. 175 P.3d 418 (Or. 2007). 
96. Id. at. 420–22, 434. 
97. See Linde, supra note 1, at 181–87 (summarizing critique). 
98. See Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 338–40, 351–57 (Or. 2001) 
(summarizing procedural due process decisions under article I, section 10); Tupper v. Fairview 
Hosp. and Training Ctr., Mental Health Div., 556 P.2d 1340, 1345–48 (Or. 1976) (O’Connell, J., 
specially concurring) (concluding that article I, section 10, required pre-termination notice and 
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CONCLUSION: DOES OREGON’S CONSTITUTION NEED A DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE? 
Returning to our legislator’s question, one response is that we have a 
Federal Due Process Clause, so we don’t need another one in the state 
constitution. The Federal Due Process Clause protects our procedural 
and substantive rights, and it is regularly interpreted and applied by 
federal and state courts. As Alan Tarr notes, in describing Linde’s state 
law first approach, the Federal Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses are “state-failure” provisions, available to protect rights if state 
law does not.99 But the United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter 
of those federal constitutional provisions, of course, so in the absence of 
an analogous state provision, states lose the potential for a more 
expansive, rights-protective interpretation of due process. In contrast, the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own constitution is not 
subject to federal review, even when that interpretation is different from 
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of parallel federal 
constitutional provisions. When one considers the importance of the 
state constitution’s free speech and search and seizure provisions (as 
interpreted by the Oregon courts) to Oregon law, and our preference not 
to rely on federal interpretations of the parallel federal constitutional 
guarantees, the inability to take the same approach to rights that could be 
protected under a state due process clause starts to look significant. 
Looking at the Oregon Constitution as it is, without a due process 
clause, does it protect the rights we think important? Like many state 
constitutions, Oregon’s contains a number of provisions that expressly 
protect rights or impose limits on government actions, often in robust 
terms. Our free speech provision, article I, section 8, for example, 
protects the right to “speak, write, or print freely on any subject 
whatever,” although each person is “responsible for the abuse of this 
right.”100 The constitution bars the appropriation of money for any 
religious institution,101 protects the right of the “people to bear arms for 
the defence [sic] of themselves,”102 provides specific directions 
related procedural protections to state employee; criticizing majority for relying on federal due 
process without first considering state constitution). Moreover, the procedural aspects of article I, 
section 10, are supported by specific provisions protecting the right to a jury trial in criminal (article 
I, section 11) and civil cases (article I, section 17). 
99. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 184 (1998). 
100. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
101. Id. § 5. 
102. Id. § 27. 
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regarding bail,103 and requires that punishments be proportioned to the 
offense,104 just to name a few. More recent provisions give crime victims 
the right to participate in proceedings against those who have caused 
them harm and the right to receive restitution.105 And just recently in 
November 2014, voters approved an “equal rights amendment,” 
providing that equal rights “shall not be denied or abridged . . . on 
account of sex.”106 When state courts rely on those specific state 
constitutional provisions, rather than the Federal Due Process Clause, 
they have more substantive guidance from the state constitution’s 
framers about the meaning and scope of the restrictions they sought to 
impose on state government and the rights they wanted to protect. 
Even without a due process clause that tracks the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the Oregon Constitution has provisions that protect some 
important procedural rights, ranging from specific rights related to jury 
trials and appellate review to the more general right to a “remedy by due 
course of law for injury” to person, property or reputation in article I, 
section 10.107 And in terms of substantive review of statutes and other 
state actions, the Oregon Constitution, as noted previously, does contain 
two broadly phrased, potentially far-reaching, provisions: The open 
courts/remedies provision of article I, section 10,108 and the equal 
privileges and immunities provision of article I, section 20.109 But the 
extent to which those provisions could be interpreted to protect the kind 
of individual rights covered by the “substantive” component of the 
Federal Due Process Clause is unclear. 
Are there potential laws or policies so oppressive, intrusive, or unfair 
that most thoughtful people would consider them beyond the authority of 
state government—but that do not appear to violate any existing 
provision of the Oregon Constitution? Take, for example, the ban on the 
use of contraceptives by married couples that gave rise to the “right to 
privacy” articulated in Griswold.110 A more far-fetched hypothetical, but 
perhaps useful for discussion purposes, would be a state law that ordered 
the removal of children from their parents at the age of two, to be 
returned to the parents at age ten. Such a law would presumably be 
103. Id. §§ 14, 16. 
104. Id. § 13. 
105. Id. § 42. 
106. Id. § 46. 
107. Id. § 10. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. § 20. 
110. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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found to violate parental rights protected by “substantive due process” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the fact that nothing in the 
Constitution speaks specifically to such rights. 
Does the Oregon Constitution offer anything to citizens who might 
challenge the hypothetical statute allowing the state to take custody of 
all children? Certainly, a court would look hard at the “remedy” clause 
and the equal privileges and immunities provision, both of which are 
written in capacious, general terms and which sometimes have been 
interpreted expansively—although neither speaks very clearly to rights 
of parenthood, privacy, or personal autonomy. Some decisions 
interpreting the “remedy” clause have stated that it provides a remedy 
only for rights that existed when the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 
1857,111 and although the equal privileges and immunities provision has 
played the role of an equal protection clause, it has been interpreted as a 
bar against discrimination and unequal treatment, rather than as the 
source of unenumerated personal rights.112 
An Oregon court faced with a claim asserting a novel constitutional 
right could perhaps draw some support from article I, section 33, which 
provides, “[t]his enumeration of rights, and privileges shall not be 
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”113 That 
provision, of course, is almost identical to the Ninth Amendment, which 
the Supreme Court relied upon, in part, in Griswold.114 It suggests, at a 
minimum, that the framers of the Oregon Constitution did not view the 
specific “rights” and “privileges” enumerated in the Oregon Bill of 
Rights as encompassing all the rights that Oregonians “retain.” But it 
gives no indication of what those rights might be or the sources to which 
one might look for them, let alone the scope and limitations of any 
unenumerated rights.115 
The task, however, probably would not be any less daunting—or less 
firmly rooted in constitutional text, or less controversial—than the 
111. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 356 (Or. 2001).  
112. See, e.g., Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 445–47 (Or. 1998) (discussing 
meaning and application of article 1, section 20); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 653 P.2d 970, 
975–78 (Or. 1982) (same). 
113. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 33. 
114. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–87.  
115. Few cases discuss or even cite article I, section 33. However, in Hall v. Northwest Outward 
Bound School, 572 P.2d 1007 (Or. 1977), Justice Linde suggested an extremely limited view of the 
provision, stating that any “rights, and or privileges” would probably need to be asserted by the 
legislature, rather than by the judiciary, and that the only rights that could be “retained” would be 
rights that were recognized as such at the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted. Id. at 1010–11 
n.11. Whether Linde’s brief comments are correct or not is a topic for another day.  
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efforts of the United States Supreme Court to decide what is protected 
by the substantive component of the Federal Due Process Clause. 
Certainly, in states like Oregon and Washington, with their strong 
traditions of independent state constitutional analysis, the courts would 
approach such challenges with open minds—and likely would not find 
the absence of a state due process clause to make much difference one 
way or the other. On the other hand, as discussed above, the texts, 
origins and purposes of Oregon’s remedy and equal privileges and 
immunities provisions are distinct from those of a true “due process” 
clause. A due process clause in the Oregon Constitution would be 
another “great ordinance” in the constitutional toolkit, another source 
courts could look to in constitutional cases to help ensure that the 
fundamental rights of Oregon citizens are protected, even as state and 
local governments engaged in the necessary regulatory activities that our 
society needs to function effectively. In the end, perhaps Oregon’s 
constitution could use a due process clause after all. 
 
 
